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 It is hard to deny the significance of the Islamist movement in the
contemporary Middle East. Indications of this significance are rampant. Not
only have we seen a rise in Islamist terrorism within the past decade or so but
we have witnessed the political landscape of the Middle East become
increasingly shaped by politicized and mobilized Islamist movements. The
recent majority gain of Hamas in the 2006 Palestinian parliamentary election
is one example. Similarly so are the gains made by the Muslim Brotherhood
in last years’ Egyptian parliamentary election, in which the Muslim
Brotherhood doubled its representation. The Islamist movement is indeed a
substantial force in the politics of the Middle East and global order.
What we are witnessing has been referred to as the consequences of
both the Islamic Resurgence (Huntington, 1996) and Islamist activism
(Wickham, 2002). In general both labels refer to the same phenomenon, and
that is the effort to produce political and societal changes within Middle
Eastern states by adherents to or supporters of the Islamist ideology. The
Islamist ideology is politicized Islam that essentially believes that the state
should be governed according to Sharia, Islamic law, and all political,
economic, and social aspects of life should be orientated around and guided
by Islam.
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A lot of the mainstream, conventional wisdom concerning the Islamist
movement portrays its followers as irrational radicals who wish to return to the
earlier history of Islam. As William Shepard explains this is a gross
generalization, “radical Islamists undoubtedly want to undo many effects of
Western-style ‘progress,’ but this is not the same as wanting to turn the clock
back” (1987, p.316). To simplify even further, Islamists “not only want
progress but insist that Islam is the way to get it” (Shepard, 1987, p.316).
In order to achieve this progress Islamists utilize a broad range of
strategies. Some attempt to work through political avenues in order to
gradually reform society in accordance with their envisioned Islamist state,
such as the contemporary Muslim Brotherhood. While other, more
revolutionary groups try to achieve their ends through violence. Such groups
include Islamic Jihad, Islamic Group, and any number of Al Qaeda affiliates.
Each strategy is part of the larger phenomenon of activism. Carrie Wickham
defines activism as “collective challenges, based on common purposes, and
social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and
authorities” (Wickham, 2002, p.5). Islamist activism is thus activism that
aspires to, or adheres to the Islamist ideology. Islamist activists engage in the
action outlined in the concept of activism in an attempt to make gains in
implementing their ideology either through the institutions and systemic
confines of the state, as seen by the participation of groups in the
parliamentary process, or by violently removing the institutions and system of
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the state itself.  Therefore activism can include, but is not limited to forms of
collective violence, including terrorism.
One explanation for the momentum of the Islamist movement is the
idea that it is the consequence of an ongoing and inevitable clash of
civilizations.  Bernard Lewis explains:
It should now be clear that we are facing a mood and a movement far
transcending the level of issues and policies and the governments that
pursue them. This is no less than a clash of civilizations—that perhaps
irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our
Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide
expansion of both. It is crucially important that we on our side should
not be provoked into an equally historic but also equally irrational
reaction against that rival. (2001, p.26)
According to Lewis the antecedents of the Islamist movement lie in the
variables of culture and civilization. The closest he and others who subscribe
to this understanding can come to articulating the variable influencing the
growth of the Islamist movement is no more than the cultural differences and
cultural antipathy that exists between the Islamic civilization and the Judeo-
Christian civilization. Included in this antipathy are the feelings of humiliation
wrought by the inferiority of Islam and the superiority and dominance of the
West. The clash of civilizations paradigm is heavy handed in its focus on
cultural differences, clashing civilizations, and resentment that runs along
cultural fault lines, stressing that the differences between East and West,
Orient and Occident are becoming increasingly irreconcilable and increasingly
fuel the Islamist movement. As a result of this observed incompatibility the
clash of civilizations theory largely ignores the impact structural elements
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have on the growth of the Islamist movement. Lewis’s above argument, that
structural matters such as government policies and programs are insignificant
to the momentum of the Islamist movement illustrates this point. This project
categorically rejects his approach. Instead it seeks to observe and establish a
correlation between the popular momentum of the Islamist movement and the
impact structural change can have on society.
 This approach is similar to the political economy model and like other
political economy analyses it seeks to correlate “the rise of Islamic activism to
the absence of economic prosperity and political freedom in the states of the
Middle East and North Africa” (Wickham, 2002, p. 7). Though these factors
may be the most self-evident correlations available, this paper seeks to
explain in detail how and why economic and political grievances contributed
to Islamist activism.
The most pressing understanding necessary to comprehending the
popularity of the Islamist movement is the fact that it was not born merely out
of poverty and dictatorships. Nor could it have suddenly been born from
culture. Some circumstance, or circumstances had to occur in order to
produce the movement’s current momentum. The approach taken in this
project is one that seeks to explain the reemergence of the Islamist
movement in the 1970s in Egypt. For the fact that this phenomenon has been
observed as resurgence or reemergence suggests that something had to
change within the socio-political milieu of Egypt in order for the Islamist
movement to possess a social salience it lacked before.
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In order to achieve this understanding this paper will work within the
theoretical framework that links modernization and a decline in economic
opportunities with an increased potential for political unrest. An environment
of civil unrest, ripe with riots, rebellion, revolution or terrorism is also an
environment ripe with activism.  Therefore it is possible to link the rise in
Islamist activism with the concept of relative deprivation as found in the work
of Robert Ted Gurr (1970) and Samuel Huntington (1968).  In essence this
project will show the positive correlation between modernization and activism.
More specifically it will showcase how Egyptian’s value expectations were 1)
raised by Nasser’s modernizing reforms, 2) frustrated by economic downturn
and economic reforms under Sadat, 3) how this frustration contributed to the
politicization of the social grievances, and 4) why this politicization adopted an
Islamist approach in addressing these grievances.
The first chapter explores the breadth of the Islamism movement,
discussing misconceptions about the movement, and dissecting the
complexities of thought and behavior within the movement. The second
chapter focuses on the relevance of the relative deprivation model for this
study, exploring how modernization increases the likelihood for rebellion,
revolution, or activism. The third chapter scrutinizes the modernizing reforms
carried about by Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser. The fourth chapter
briefly compares the degree of political repression under Nasser, Sadat, and
Mubarak while seeking an explanation as to why activism differed under
these administrations despite a steady degree of draconian political policies.
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The fifth chapter details the failure of the infitah, and the sixth chapter
discusses the Islamic sectors response to Sadat’s economic policies. 
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Chapter 1:
The Breadth of Islamism
In seeking to understand the contributions of socioeconomic and
political elements to Islamist activism it is, of course, important to understand
the complexity of the Islamist ideology and Islamist phenomenon. Subject to
Western over simplifications and other misconceptions, the Islamist ideology,
or Islamism has a wide range of different interpretations among both its
adherents and scholars. Just as communism, or socialism differed between
Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, as well as differing between the Soviet system,
Yugoslavian system and Chinese system, what constitutes Islamism differs
among polities, factions, and geographical areas. In this sense the Islamist
movement is by no means monolithic, rather it is a phenomenon comprised of
many different factions who all agree on the implementation of Sharia, Islamic
Law. As this chapter will show the term and concept of Sharia is wrought with
complexity.
Common Western conceptions of Islamism attribute to the movement
“an anti-democratic, hostile philosophy that encourages violence and
terrorism and poses a risk to both regional stability and Western interests”
(Abed-Kotob, 1995, p.321). Along with this view is the conception that
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Islamists are similar to fascists. One author, cited by Ahmad S. Moussalli,
expresses this viewpoint:
The neo-Islamic totalitarian movements are essentially fascist
movements. They concentrate on mobilizing passion and violence to
enlarge the power of their charismatic leader and the solidarity of the
movement. They view the material progress primarily as a means of
accumulating strength for political expansion and entirely deny
individual and social freedom, They champion the values and emotions
of a heroic past, but repress all free critical analysis of their past roots
or present problems. (Moussalli, 1992, p.12)
The 9/11 Commission continues this idea of Islamism as anti-democratic and
also anti-state, claiming that Islamists reject the validity of “parliaments and
legislation” (9/11 Commission Report, 2004, p.50). Within the roots of this
assessment lies the belief that Islamism is an anti-modern or anti-progressive
ideology.  Bernard Lewis adds to this perception, stating that Islamist:
fundamentalists perceive the problem of the Muslim World to be not
insufficient modernization, but an excess of modernization—and even
modernization itself. For them democracy is an alien and infidel
intrusion, part of the larger more pernicious influence of the Great
Satan and his cohorts.” (2005, p.48).
Lewis goes on, noting that these anti-modern sentiments have “found
expression in an increasingly influential literature and in a series of activist
movements, the most notable of which is the Muslim Brotherhood” (2005,
p.48).
This confrontationist, or incompatibility paradigm is another aspect of
the overall clash of civilizations worldview. By regarding Islamism in its totality
as incompatible not only with Western concepts of political modernization, but
with modernization as a whole, the obvious conclusion of such beliefs is that it
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would be impossible for this ideology or phenomenon to exist in the modern
era and therefore must be, and inevitably will be shunned, refuted, and
challenged at every possible turn.
The other less prevailing conception of Islamism is the argument that
“hostility and violence are not inherent in all the factions of the Islamist
movement and prudence requires the West to display a willingness to
cooperate with what might prove to be an inevitable rising power in the Middle
East” (Abded-Kotob, 1995, pp.321-322). From this perspective the Islamist
movement is a phenomenon comprised of militant radicals and parliamentary
reformers.
It is from the militant factions that the West perceives the Islamists as
fascists, backward, or totalitarian. Images of the Taliban’s Afghanistan come
to mind, as do rural areas of Pakistan and of course the extreme measures of
Islamist terror groups. To conclude that all of these examples are evidence of
the entire Islamist movement is to ignore the complexity of the movement and
the understanding of Sharia itself.
In a rough breakdown of categorization the spectrum of behavioral
orientation of Islamist groups extends from what could be termed traditional
Islamists to revolutionary Islamists to reformer Islamists. In most cases the
traditional Islamists are reactionary groups, whose reaction to modernity is
one of retreat and return to the earlier times of Islam. The most reactionary of
Islamist movements are often found in the broader rubric of Wahabbism. The
Wahabbi movement was itself a response to the early modernizing, or at least
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urbanizing going on within the Ottoman Empire. It has since housed a
reactionary response to Westernization, secularization, modernity and
progressive Islam. A good example of the reactionary Islamist is found in
Saudi Arabia’s Wahabbi clerics and the country’s Sharia.
In some cases Islamists can appear to be revolutionary. In this sense
these groups are revolutionary in their interpretations of Islam and in their
advocacy of jihad, or violence. In all reality the revolutionaries pick and
choose aspects of modernity that are suitable to their means and reject those
which contradict or are seen as harmful to Islam. Both the revolutionary and
the reactionary groups are more prone to violence than are those belonging
to the reformer camp. It is these militant groups that are called to mind when
the conventional term radical Islamist militant is invoked by scholars or the
media.  This categorization is not meant to be absolutely definitive. There is
often confusion surrounding the division between revolutionaries and
reformers, as revolutionaries are often reformers who have grown impatient
with the progress of their reforms and believe in immediate, militant action. An
example is found in the fact that many revolutionary Islamists have at one
time or another belonged to the Muslim Brotherhood (MB); however, their
violent behavior should not be seen as something condoned by the MB.
Again one can witness similar internal debates within a variety of Marxist
movements.
The reformist category is modern in the sense that it seeks not to reject
modernity, but rather looks to synthesize Islam with modernity. The more
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reformist movements are organizations like the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.
Instead of pursuing a policy of violence the Muslim Brotherhood believes in
the gradual growth and spreading of its ideology through the process of good
works. Some even go so far as to view the Muslim Brotherhood as a “socialist
organization, not a political party” (Aslan, 2005, p.237). This perception stems
from the fact that the MB’s “principle concern [is] the reconciling of hearts and
minds to God so as to alleviate human suffering, not bring about a political
revolution” (Aslan, 2005, p.237).  Another author adds, “the return to Islam
was envisioned as an evolutionary process to be achieved by means of
comprehensive education aimed at everyone…”(Mishal, 2000, p.20).  The
acceptance of gradualism and evolutionary processes are in direct contrast to
the impatience and call for immediacy attributed to radical, militant or
revolutionary movements.
Aslan’s claim that the MB is not a political party is not entirely accurate,
since the organization has run candidates in parliamentary elections;
however, the relevance of Aslan’s statement is the fact that the MB is not
militant. This is apparent in the organization’s own statements, like its
condemnation of the attacks in Egypt on April 24, 2006. The Muslim
Brotherhood, reaffirmed their, “complete rejection of violence to achieve
change” (Habib, 2006), and condemned “attacks on innocent people which
constitute a flagrant violation of the peaceful teachings of Islam” (Habib,
2006).
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The patience and political pragmatism absent in militant groups is
further observable in the Muslim Brotherhood’s political behavior. In the
1980s the organization formed a coalition with liberal Egyptian political parties
in order to gain seats in parliament. Yet Aslan’s characterization of the Muslim
Brotherhood as apolitical is also in reference to the organization’s own
understanding and statements concerning any rise to power. The MB claim it
does not necessarily seek political power as a political party, rather it seeks to
“build Islamic individuals who will then build an Islamic state” (Abed-Kotob,
1995, p.324). The Muslim Brotherhood stresses its commitment to reform
society, and not to “the direct exercise of political power” (Abed-Kotob, 1995,
p.325).  In this sense one could understand that though the MB fields
parliamentary candidates it is not its intention to eradicate the parliamentary
system or even dominate the apparatus of the state. Rather it appears the MB
seeks to participate within the system, reforming the system and creating the
environment ripe for the “return to Islam” through the democratic consensus
of the governed. The fact that the MB chose to work gradually within the
system differentiates them from more extreme movements who themselves
advocate rapid, mobilized, violent change of the political structure. Embracing
the established political process, and again, the emphasis on gradualism is
illustrative of the differences between the reformists and the militant Islamist
groups who seek to retreat from and, or eradicate the established system.
Of course the prevalence of the perception of Islamism as a
phenomenon opposed to legislatures and the parliamentary process and thus
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democracy is understandable when one examines the sayings and slogans of
Islamists. One time Muslim Brother Sayyid Qutb expressed the view,
paraphrased here by Moussalli, that “man should organize his life and society
in accordance with the divine will and revelation [of God], since the Muslim
should believe that there is no ruler except God, no legislator except God and
no organizer of man’s life and relations and connections with the universe,
beings and his fellow man except God” (1992, p.71).
Qutb’s mention of divine will and revelation refers to the Qu’ran and
Hadith the two sources from which Sharia is derived. Thus Qutb is referring to
the implementation of Sharia, or at least the organization of a state around
the concepts of Sharia. The illuminating aspect of Sharia in understanding the
complexities of the Islamist movement, the aspect most overlooked by those
that attribute a monolithic quality to the movement, is the fact that though
Sharia is divine revelation it is by no means absolute.
Sharia, Islamic Law, is taken from the revelation of the Qu’ran and the
Hadith. The Qu’ran is the divine word of God, revealed by God to the Prophet
Mohamed. The Hadith is the teachings and lessons based off of the Prophet’s
life. Sharia is a legal or governing synthesis of the relevant scriptures and
teachings within the two, covering “all aspects of Muslim life—public and
private, communal and personal alike”(Lewis, 1998, p.223). Yet to regard
Sharia as a set of explicit instructions is misleading. In all actuality Sharia,
though based on the written scriptures in the Qu’ran and the expressed living
examples in the Hadith, is a malleable body of law argued and debated by
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Islamic clerics and Islamic-jurists. Bernard Lewis explains the interpretive
complexities of Sharia:
While the Sharia admitted no human legislative power in the Islamic
state, in practice Muslim rulers and jurists during more than fourteen
centuries that have passed since the mission of the Prophet
encountered many problems for which revelation provided no explicit
answer, and found answers to them. These answers were not seen or
presented as enactments or as legislation. If they came from below
they were called customs. If they came from above they were called
regulations. If they came from the jurists, they were called
interpretation…. (1998, p.224)
Another scholar explains, “Law, in the sense of a body of precisely articulated
rules, is thus not readily presented in Islam; it must be unearthed by the
jurists who become the necessary mediators of divine law” (Masood, 2003,
p.2). An appropriate way to view Sharia is, as an integration of customs,
concepts of political order, and societal norms filtered through the art of
interpretation of the revelation given by God in the Qu’ran and its execution
by the Prophet in the Hadith.
This act of interpretation is called ijtihad. A western comparison could
be made to the process of judicial review. Masood explains “the word ijtihad
means a total expenditure of effort in the attempt to achieve something whose
realization is burdensome or difficult. Commonly referred to as independent
reasoning, ijtihad is a fundamental Islamic concept…”(2003, p.4). Though the
concept of ijtihad is found in Sharia, it is also true that around the tenth
century the interpretive introspection of the Law ascribed by the concept of
ijtihad was reduced until the doors of ijtihad were closed (Lewis, 2002;
Masood, 2003). It was believed that “further inquiry would be without purpose
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or meaning” (Masood, 2003, p.4), Lewis adds, “ a consensus emerged among
Sunni jurists that all outstanding issues had been resolved” (2002, p.226). It
was from this event and point that Sharia was formulated into a body of laws
and legal rulings. With this said, however, there are in themselves different
interpretations concerning Sharia, such as how it should be applied to the
contemporary world. The dissolution of the Caliphate after WWI and the
encounter of modernity has diluted any centralized consensus and triggered
increase debate about Sharia and ijtihad in the Muslim world. This debate is
very much alive and ongoing in the Muslim World, and even exists among
Islamists themselves.
Among Islamists the more militant Islamists “tend to accept more of the
past ijtihad of the scholars and emphasize somewhat less the failings of the
community of pre-modern times and some what more the distortions caused
by Western colonialism” (Shepard, 1987, p.314). In this sense the militant
Islamists for the most part uphold the tenth century consensus that all the
outstanding issues concerning Sharia had been solved. The plight facing the
Middle East and the realms of Islam is not the result of the fallibility of tenth
century Sharia, rather it’s the fault of meddling European powers. From this
perspective the Islamists are less embracing of modernity, and are not
seeking a synthesis between Islam, Sharia, and modernity. Rather they are
seeking an escape from modernity and a return to Sharia without synthesizing
Sharia and modernity through the process of ijtihad. This understanding
corresponds to the confrontationist understanding of Islamism and tends to be
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the perspective of Saudi Arabian Sharia as well as groups like the Taliban.
Any problem of reconciling the modern world with Islam is the fault of the
modern world, thus Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan are fundamental in their
endorsement and enforcement of the tenth century Sharia.
To the reformer Islamists, on the other hand, the gates of ijtihad are
indeed open. Members of this category are in agreement with their more
extremist comrades that the ordering of society should be based off of Sharia;
however, they disagree when it comes to implementing Sharia comprised of
tenth century ijtihad in their contemporary world. It is Sharia that is divine,
ijtihad like all human things are fallible as well as malleable. Thus from the
view of the reformist Islamists the decisions made by the jurists some several
hundred years ago are open to question and reinterpretation. Masood
explains the compatibility between reinterpretation and Sharia in that
“challenging the Sharia to adapt to changing circumstances is simply
disputing a historically conditioned human understanding of Islam and not
repudiating Islam itself” (2003, p.5). This approach is being undertaken and
understood by progressive and reformists Islamists.
 Muslim women’s groups are taking the reformist track and using the
verses of the Qu’ran as well as ijtihad to promote women’s rights in the
Muslim world. Isabella Coleman points out:
On the sensitive subject of polygamy, for example, one verse of the
Koran says, ‘Marry those women who are lawful for you, up to two,
three or four, but only if you can treat them all equally.’ Later in the
same chapter, however, the Koran reads, ‘No matter how you try you
will never able to treat your wives equally.’ Many Muslim scholars
today read the two together, as an effective endorsement of
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monogamy. Many tribal communities, on the other hand, focus on the
former verse alone and cite it as a justification for having multiple
wives. (2006, p.27)
Despite the closing of ijtihad some Muslim scholars have continued to engage
in interpreting Sharia. Even radical Islamists like Sayyid Qutb are not opposed
to reopening the doors of ijtihad. As Moussalli explains, “ for the
fundamentalists, these branches of knowledge (traditions of philosophy,
theology and jurisprudence), especially the political and intellectual as
opposed to the ritual, have to be reevaluated and verified by a new direct
interpretation of Islam” (1992, p.217). Shepard classifies those who endorse
the re-opening of ijtihad as Islamist modernists. This classification contains
both radical and reformists groups. According to this perspective Muslims
should “not rely on the ‘medieval synthesis’ represented by the four schools of
jurisprudence but they [should] go back directly to the Qu’ran and the Sunna
to seek fresh interpretation and synthesis for modern times, and
also…superstitions derived from local pre-Islamic cultures [should] be
eliminated” (Shepard, 1987, p.311).
The following chart (Fig 1) shows the orientation towards the
parliamentary process and attitudinal position of ijtihad among Islamist
groups. In the spectrum of the phenomenon of Islamism there exists in one
corner the reactionary elements. The Wahabbi movements in general are
more reactionary to any change, reject modern political systems, and are less
interested in opening the gates of ijtihad. These factors place them in the
upper orientation, making them more militant towards parliamentary political
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systems and institutions. For them perfection was in the past and perfection
can only result in preferring the past to the present. These groups should be
considered to be radical in methods but traditional in interpretation of Sharia.
In the case of Saudi Arabia the fact that Sharia is the law of the land, it is not
as so much behaviorally militant as it is traditional. In the case of the Taliban,
the ongoing struggle for control of Afghanistan and opposition to a reformed
set of laws puts it in the upper left quadrant. To the reactionary movements
ijtihad is closed and their implementation of Sharia relies mostly on the ijtihad
of the tenth century consensus.
There are then revolutionary groups in another corner, who are more
likely to utilize radical/militant methods, and are also more radical in their use
of ijtihad to challenge the consensus of the medieval jurists. These groups
can appear more fundamental than their tenth century counterparts; some
examples are seen with Al Qaeda and Islamic Jihad, both of which endorse
using ijtihad as a means to make Sharia more fundamental. These groups
wish to construct society closer to the original revelations in the Qu’ran and
the practices in the Hadith and therefore believe in engaging in ijtihad. Unlike
the reformists; however, and more like the reactionaries, the revolutionaries
hold such a fundamental view that any un-Islamic system is illegitimate, and
thus must be met and dispatched through violence.
Finally, the reformists are in the opposite corner of the militant
reactionaries’ acceptance of the tenth century consensus, and opposed to the
revolutionaries’ militancy. The Islamist reformists are less militant and less
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fundamental, but more open in their use of ijtihad as an attempt to uncover a
unity of synthesis between modernity and Islam. The Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood is parliamentary in the sense that they are willing to gradually
work within the established Egyptian political system and through the
democratic process. Their attitude towards ijtihad is one in which the doors
are open and the debate over Sharia’s character still on going. In all likelihood
the MB’s conception of Sharia, even one that could conceivably become more
compatible than the tenth century Sharia with the modern world, would tend
to be considered conservative by Western liberal standards.
The Islamist Feminists; however, are even farther along the spectrum
of reform and engaging in ijtihad. Unlike the Wahabbi movements, the
Islamist Feminists reject the closure of ijtihad, and the tenth century
consensus. Unlike the Muslim Brothers’ the Islamist Feminist engage in the
debate over Sharia through ijtihad in the attempt to construct a starkly liberal
form of Islamic Law.
The consensus within Islamism is one that believes there should be,
within Muslim countries “an Islamic system where Islamic law is executed
where the idea of Islam rules and where its principles and regulations define
the kind of government and form of society” (Abed-Kotob, 1995, p.323). The
agreement among Islamists remains at the level of a philosophical or
theoretical consensus. There is no definitive, or explicit model of governance
in which Islamists have all come to endorse or agree on.  To what end such a
system would enact the Sharia of the tenth century, or engage and encourage
20
continued ijtihad, and attempt to reconcile modernity with Islam, or return to
the medieval age of Islam depends on the orientation of the Islamist group
who comes to power.
                       Taliban
                                                          Saudi Arabia Sharia
      Al Qaeda &
Islamic Jihad
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood
     Islamist Feminists
Islamist attitudes towards ijtihad and parliamentary participation (Fig 1)
The differences within Islamism are important to understand when
searching for an explanation of the ideology’s phenomenon. The
confrontationist perspective of perceiving Islamism as a monolithic, totalitarian
ideology in which individual freedoms are curtailed and oppression is almost
guaranteed, leads one to expect a strong fanaticism in the movement’s
supporters. This assumption can dilute the relevance of any investigation. A
similar example is seen in what was once the conventional wisdom of
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German support for Nazism. The argument suggested that Nazis were bad
people and therefore bad people became Nazis. The contemporary,
conventional argument for Islamism is that Islamism is fanatical; therefore
Islamic fanatics become Islamists. This approach prompts scholars to ask the
question: why are Muslims attracted to a fanatical ideology? Or why are
Muslims becoming more fanatical? Scholars throughout the literature have
attempted to offer answers to these questions, using explanations of
humiliation at the hands of the West, a crisis of identity, and the disorienting
effects of the modern world on the Muslim/Arab mind.
By looking at the Islamist ideology as one that is indeed fragmented,
and open to a certain amount of popular influence, moderate positions, and
reformist approaches the explanations for its popularity shift considerably. No
longer is anti-modern fanaticism the sole and sufficient explanation for the
popularity of the Islamist movement. For how can the confrontationist
scholars explain the fanaticism of a reformer, a moderate, or an Islamist
feminist? Therefore it is necessary to search for other relationships that can




The Relevance of Relative Deprivation
The Islamist movement in Egypt can be dissected into three periods.
The first, beginning with the founding of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928 and
extending to approximately 1952, is regarded as a period of emergence.
During the 1940s the Islamist movement was strong, political, and worked
with other dissident groups in expelling British and foreign influence
(Goldschmidt, 2004). After the 1952 Revolution, Nasser and the Free Officers
persecuted the Islamist movement’s leading members in the Muslim
Brotherhood, as they were the strongest rivals to the military’s power. This
persecution, imprisonment and liquidation began the second period that
lasted from 1952 to roughly 1970. Though the Muslim Brotherhood was
banned and under assault from the regime, Nasser’s repression of Islamists
does not fully account for the lack of public receptiveness to the Islamist
ideology. As this paper will explain and elaborate on it was during this period
that the sustainability of the Islamist movement diminished and lost ground
against the rise of Arab Socialism and nationalism. However, in the third and
present period, the Islamist resurgence, the Islamist ideology returned as a
counter worldview to the secular Egyptian system, reemerging stronger than
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ever before and has sustained itself for thirty plus years, seemingly gaining
momentum within each decade.
Perhaps one of the most obvious questions to ask when looking at this
pattern of the Islamist movement in Egypt is, Why the 1970s? What was
different about the 70s then the 60s? For one the 1970s were a great period
of upheaval, turmoil and change within Egypt. The conventional wisdom
attributes this turbulence and the rise of Islamist activism as consequences of
Egypt’s defeat in 1967 and in Sadat’s peace proposal with Israel at Camp
David in 1978. There is no doubt that these events had an influence on the
Islamist movement, but to causally link the growth of the Islamist movement
with these events is too simplistic and still leaves lingering questions. For one
it lacks a relevant explanation as to why the Islamist movement faded in
popularity and momentum during the 1950s and 1960s. This recession
occurred despite the fact that Israel existed during this period and initially
defeated Egypt in the 1948 War. It appears that a historical explanation,
based solely on events, as well as one based on differences of civilization as
observed by the confrontationist theorists are both lacking. Therefore another
explanation is needed in order to explain the resurgence of the Islamist
movement. The most likely and relevant explanation is one that scrutinizes
the structural shifts in Egypt throughout the post-revolution period.
This project’s focus of structural explanations for Islamist activism
works out of the theoretical framework of what produces civil unrest, as seen
in Gurr (1970) and Huntington (1968). The 1970s resurgence of the Islamist
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movement can be explained by the concept of relative deprivation. The
concept of relative deprivation is defined as “a perceived discrepancy
between man’s value expectations and their value capabilities. Value
expectations are the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they
are rightfully entitled. Value capabilities are the goods and conditions they
think they are capable of attaining or maintaining, given the social means
available to them” (Gurr, 1970, p.13). When the populace’s expectations are
increased but the capabilities to achieve those expectations are not, social
tension and discontent intensify. Gurr links civil unrest, or rebellion, with
relative deprivation, stating, “discontent arising from the perception of relative
deprivation is the basic instigating condition for participation in collective
violence” (1970, p.13). The mobilization of this discontent is what I am
referring to as activism, though the definition of this term has already been
given due to its prominence in this project it bears repeating. Activism is
“collective challenges, based on common purposes, and social solidarities, in
sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities” (Wickham, 2002,
p.5).
 A key component in creating an environment salient to these effects of
relative deprivation is modernization. In other words without modernization
the impact of relative deprivation on mobilizing broad based dissent is
diminished. Huntington explains “the principle aspects of modernization [are]
urbanization, industrialization, secularization, democratization, education,
[and] media participation” (1968, p.32). Since not all of these aspects are
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necessarily present in all modernization processes the more important
understanding is that “modernization is a multi-faced process involving
changes in all areas of human thought and activity” (Huntington, 1968, p.32).
Huntington and Gurr both agree that modernization facilitates a shift in both
people’s perceived value capabilities and value expectations. Like Gurr,
Huntington too notes the potential for a gap to develop “between aspirations
and expectations, want formation and want satisfaction, or the aspirations
function and the level-of-living function” (1968, p.54).
 In countries of low modernization it is usually some part of the elite
who rebel.  Coup leaders and rebels are members of the modernized sector
of society. This is the case in just about every Third World uprising, and it is
indeed the case of the Free Officers revolt in Egypt (Davies, 1962). The Free
Officers came from the most modernized institution in Egypt, the military.
Despite the hatred of the British and their puppet King the populace did not
rebel, rather change had to come from an elite segment of society.
Modernization does not necessarily have to be present for rebellion to occur;
however, one could argue that in order for their to be broad mobilization of
discontent, or what this project refers to as activism the means for mass
participation in politics must exist, this capability is obtained through
modernization and antagonized through relative deprivation. Again
Huntington offers an explanation:
More than by anything else, the modern state is distinguished from the
traditional state by the broadened extent to which people participate in
politics and are affected by politics in large-scale political units…the
most fundamental aspect of modernization consequently is the
26
participation in politics beyond the village or town level by social
groups throughout the society and the development of new political
institutions, such as political parties, to organize that participation.
(1968, p.36)
Modernization is an important accelerant in fomenting strong activism. The
broader the modernization the more potential there is for broader activism. In
order to have widespread civil unrest, enough to foment sustained activism
the society must also be broadly modernized or in the process of such
modernization.
Relative deprivation and modernization go hand in hand. Huntington
lays the logical basis from which this association can be derived by explaining
the effects of modernization, “modernization involves the fundamental shift in
values, attitudes and expectations. Traditional man expected continuity in
nature and society and did not believe in the capacity of man to change or
control either. Modern man, in contrast accepts the possibility of change and
believes in its desirability” (1968, p.32).  Here the desire for change is
synonymous as the desire for progress, such as a higher standard of living, a
more equitable society, and a more just society. The ability to dream of
progressive change also grants one the ability to perceive regressive change,
and thus intensify the likelihood for rebellion. Huntington’s modern man differs
from the traditional man in the sense that he is one of several modern men
who are mobilized, and modernized enough to participate in politics. Thus the
impact of a perceived regression of wellbeing on a modernized populace has
a stronger potential to create unrest on a mass scale.
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Looking at the post-revolutionary period of Egypt (1952 to present) one
sees that it is a clear case study, fitting the model of civil unrest wrought by
relative deprivation. The reforms made during Nasser’s regime increased the
value expectations and value capabilities of Egyptians. In the 1970s the value
capabilities were reversed, creating a conflict between expectations and
capabilities. The resulting demonstrations, riots, and terrorist attacks of the
1970s were not only examples of civil unrest and the mass participation in
politics they were also the beginning signs of Islamist activism. Thus the
popular gain under Nasser, broad modernization coupled with social reforms,
and the perception, or reality of a reversal in these gains under Sadat will
explain the recession and resurgence of the Islamist movement.
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Chapter 3:
Nasser’s Revolution and Reforms
Looking at the post-revolutionary period of Egypt (1952 to present)
there is a clear correlation between Gurr’s theory of relative deprivation and
the events of unrest in the 1970s. After all, the 1970s saw an increase in
demonstrations, riots, and terrorist attacks. Yet in order to understand how
the concept of relative deprivation became a relevant variable in Egypt’s
social and political strife it is necessary to understand the modernizing and
progressive reforms of Arab Socialism. Goldschmidt explains:
[Socialism] in predominantly Muslim states…is rarely used in the
purely Marxian sense, for Muslims can never deny the primacy of the
one God above mundane material interests, nor can they accept the a
historical dynamic based on class struggles. In Egypt the socialism has
commonly been applied to state ownership and management of the
means of production. (2004, p.134)
When the Free Officers over threw King Farouk in 1952 they published
a six-point plan. The main tenets of this plan were: the removal of the British;
the liquidation of the feudal system; the liquidation of a powerful, wealthy elite;
the establishment of social equality; building a powerful army; and
establishing a democracy (Aburish, 2004). The themes of social and
economic justice in the plan were later incorporated into the responsibilities of
the Egyptian state expressed in the government’s 1956 constitution, and were
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reiterated in the 1962 charter. The state was to guarantee every Egyptian “the
individual freedom of speech and thought, freedom of religious belief,
freedom from class exploitation, right to a job according to his abilities and
interests, medical care and old age insurance, and the right to free education
which suits his abilities” (Dekmejian, 1971, p.139).
Though the degree to which the state prohibited free speech rather
than protected it and the extent to which Nasser attempted to create a
democracy out of his dictatorship can be debated, the state did carry out
many reforms along the lines of the expressed ideals in the constitution and
the six-point plan. Most notably Egyptian society was transformed in the
areas of land reform, income distribution, education, employment, social
security, and healthcare. Prior to the reign of Nasser there were no state run
social programs in Egypt. Pensions did not exist, nor did healthcare, and
education for the most part was something for the well off. Egypt was slow to
modernize and largely functioned on its feudal roots, especially in the
countryside. The nation’s feudal structure and limited modernization aided the
British in propping up their King, and co-opting the power of the country’s
wealthy elite. Nasser’s rule and the implementation of Arab Socialism
encompassed the first large scale attempt to restructure and modernize
Egyptian society.
The first major step in post-revolution Egypt aimed at implementing
social justice and modernization was the 1952 Agrarian Reform Act. The act
limited the number of feddans (one feddan equals about an acre) one
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individual could own to 200. The law was aimed at breaking up the strong
landholders of the upper class and was the first step in dismantling the feudal
system. Furthermore “the law provided for the formation of agricultural
cooperatives, worker’s unions and regulated tenant landowner relations”
(Dekmejian, 1971, p.123).
The land reform law accomplished just what it set out to do. It
dissolved the traditional power base and created a broader distribution of
wealth. According to one author the land reform produced strikingly higher
yields in agricultural production (Ghonemy, 1968). The increase in output plus
the dispersal of land ownership had the effect of decreasing poverty. Prior to
the land reform 94 percent of all peasant landowners owned less than one
feddan (Ghonemy, 1968, p.74). Given this fact the following chart illustrates
the levels of inequality in the feudal system.
Size of feddan (acre) holdings          Average annual net income in £
More than 200 15,026
More than 50-200 1,920
More than 5-50 320
More than 1-5 54
One feddan or less 8
   (Fig 2)1
                                                 
1 National Income From Agriculture, 1945-7, Ministry of Agriculture, Department of
Agricultural Economics (Government Press, Cairo, 1948), Table 11, p. 41 (in Arabic)
£E (Egyptian Pound)=US $ 2.22. (Ghonemy, 1968, p.74).
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Given that 94 percent of Egyptian peasants prior to the land reform measure
made only 8 £ annually, a more equitable distribution of land coupled with a
higher output of production would invariably lead to an increase in income for
a large portion of the population. The land reform was the first major step in
restructuring the Egyptian economy and society. As Ghonemy explains “the
redistribution of land and the reduction of rents were to constitute a direct
attack on poverty and the extreme inequality of income distribution” (1968,
p.74). Though hard numbers of income growth are hard to come by or do not
exist, given the reality of the land distribution and the increase in productivity
it is almost certain that income levels grew, and as a consequence so did
mobility.
Mobility is another key piece of the modernization puzzle. As
Huntington explained the modernized citizen will be apt to desire change as
well as perceive the possibility of change. Social mobility aids the
modernizing of individuals as it lets them move through traditional social
strata, thus changing or breaking those structural barriers. Huntington
explains, “social mobilization, is the process by which major clusters of old
social, economic, and psychological commitments are eroded or broken and
people become available for new patterns of socialization and behavior”
(1968, p.33). The disintegration of the feudal system plus the consequential
increase in wealth distribution no doubt added to the modernizing of Egyptian
peasantry, and thus by challenging the root of the nation’s traditional class
and social structures began modernizing the whole of Egypt.
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Where the land reform was the first major step in modernizing Egypt,
the second step was the education reforms that followed. By lowering tuition
costs and raising admission numbers Nasser made primary and higher
education more accessible to the population. As Carrie Wickham (2002)
points out, this was in part necessary to produce labor for the expanding
Egyptian industries, but more importantly education reform was part of
Nasser’s ideological commitment to social equality and social justice. In 1961
speech Nasser expressed these commitments, saying: “I want a society in
which class distinctions are dissolved through the equality of opportunities of
all citizens. I want a society in which the free individual can determine his own
position by himself, on the basis of his efficiency, capacity and character”
(Wickham, 2002, p.25). The expansive access to education worked in tandem
with dissolving the traditional social and class structures within Egypt and
granted Nasser more popular prestige.
By 1962 the universities were virtually cost free (Wickham, 2002). The
universities however, were not open to anyone. Students still had to perform
well on their final exams, and the ones who did well were guaranteed
admission into the now low-cost university system. The broader accessibility
to primary education fed into broadening the socioeconomic demographics of
the universities, the low cost of a university education allowed the members of
the lower and middle class to attend and potentially alter their social status.
During Nasser’s reign “the numbers of students enrolled in primary
education per thousand of population increased by 234 percent, and the
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number of students enrolled in higher education rose by 325 percent. Annual
university enrollments climbed from 51,681 in 1952/53 to 161,517 in 1969/70”
(Wickham, 2002, p.25).
In 1962 Nasser took another step to further aid social mobilization and
class disintegration by guaranteeing employment for university graduates.
The outflow of university students was directed into employment in a
burgeoning state sector. Again Wickham cites the statistics on the policy,
noting that “public employment grew by about 70 percent from 1962 to 1970”
(2002, p.27). Eventually Nasser’s policy of expanded education and
guaranteed employment would create a top-heavy state, detrimental to
economic growth and largely lead to the crisis faced by Arab Socialism at the
end of the 1960s and in the 1970s.
In addition to the education and land reforms Nasser further enforced
the themes of equality and social justice found in the constitution and charter
by increasing the state’s control of industry and heavy regulation of the
private sector. In July 1961 the regime instituted its most revolutionary
reforms to date. These reforms came to be known as the July Laws. Arthur
Goldschmidt explains their content:
1) the regulation of most industries; 2) the nationalization of such
businesses as textiles, tobacco, pharmaceuticals, shipping , and all
banks and insurance firms not already under state ownership; 3)
income redistribution whereby no Egyptian could receive an annual
salary above  £E5,000 and incomes above £E 10,000 were to be taxed
at 90 percent; and 4) land reform, under which the maximum individual
landholding was reduced from 200 to 100 feddans, with the excess to
be distributed among the landless peasants, and all future peasant
loans would be free of interest. (2004, p.136)
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Dekmejian elaborates the July Laws further,
Controls placed on cotton sales, exports, and imports were followed by
the closure of the two stock exchanges and the futures market,
whereby no shares could be sold. Another regulatory law limited the
boards of directors of various firms to a maximum of seven members,
two of which were to represent the employees. Law No. 134 authorized
the minister of industry to assign production quotas to industrial
firms…law No. 117…nationalized the remaining banks and insurance
companies, as well as forty two industrial, commercial, and other
firms…Another sweeping measure was Law No. 119 which limited the
individual ownership to a maximum of £E 10,000 in 145 listed
companies…Finally, between October 1961 and January 1962, the
property of 850 ‘reactionaries’ was sequestered. (1971, pp. 129-130)
Egypt under Nasser witnessed a forceful reorganization of the
traditional societal structures. This was first accomplished with the land
reform act, followed by the increased accessibility to education and finally by
the nationalization of industries and state regulation of economic affairs.
Concerning Gurr’s thesis of civil unrest and relative deprivation one sees that
the Nasser years most likely fueled the likelihood for a rebellious population in
the event of a perceived reversal of expectations. This correlation is found in
Davies (1962) j-curve explanation. Gurr, citing Davies’ explanation, suggests
that, “revolutions are most likely to occur when a prolonged period of
objective economic and social development is followed by a short period of
sharp reversal” (1970, p.52). The prolonged and constant improvement of
living standards in people’s lives creates within them the expectations for
further improvement. If value capabilities decline or stagnate this conflicts with
the society’s value expectations and thus results in an environment salient for
35
civil unrest. The changes in Egypt under Nasser, and later the collapse of
Arab Socialism and the turmoil of the 1970s fits this model.
 In essence the improved living conditions wrought by Arab Socialism
in the Nasser era primed the Egyptian population with the necessary





There is a debate within the literature of Egyptian history concerning
the apparent absence of popular opposition under Nasser. Was the absence
of this opposition most likely the result of an overall absence of relative
deprivation? Or was it the result Nasser’s harsh responses to political
opposition and dissent? In trying to construct a correlation between relative
deprivation and Islamist activism it is necessary to explore what can account
for the apparent absence of strong political dissent in Egypt’s post-revolution
era.
  Nasser’s Egypt was not without dissent and opposition. As one author
explains Nasser “faced opposition from many quarters, including communists,
the wealthy, liberals, Islamists, supporters of the old Farouk regime, and
others. Nasser’s response was to jail or exile as many opponents as he could,
occasionally hanging their leaders” (Sorenson, 2003, p.218). Given the
existence of political dissent and opposition the question is, What are the
differences between this opposition and the activism of the 1970s? The
unrest in the 1970s was greater than that of under Nasser’s reign, and
furthermore terrorism had yet to emerge. In short, and working off of
Wickham’s analysis the dissent under Nasser was not strong enough, or
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formidable enough to be considered activism. Therefore it is necessary to ask
why the dissent under Nasser failed to manifest itself into the activism of the
1970s under Nasser’s successor Sadat?
One perspective concerns a shift in the level of repression between
Nasser and Sadat. Sadat did indeed liberalize Egypt’s political system
slightly, and briefly allowed Muslim groups to organize on college campuses;
however, Sadat’s repression against communists, hard line Nasserists, and
Islamists was comparable to the actions of Nasser’s repression of his
regime’s adversaries. For example Sadat kept the Law of the State of
Emergency that had been in effect since Nasser’s usurpation of power.
Political dissenters detained under the law could be tried in military courts and
were often held for lengthy periods without trial or access to council (Sadat’s
New Democracy, 1979). Sadat’s liberalization was mostly cosmetic, as the
newly allowed political parties could not discuss “peace with Israel,
superpower relations, economic policies, and of course Sadat’s person”
(Goldschmidt, 2003, p.176).
 Egypt’s current leader Hosni Mubarak has kept the tradition of his
predecessors alive by jailing large numbers of dissidents throughout his rule.
According to one author,
by one account more than 17,000 Islamic militant were arrested for
political opposition or militant violence between 1989 and 1997. Taking
advantage of the state of emergency that has remained in force in
Egypt since President Sadat’s assassination in 1981, the government
held many Islamists without charge and tried many others in military
courts… One former government official charged that even as late as
1999 ‘tens of thousands of Egyptians were being held without charge
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in Egyptian jails’…opposition candidates were intimated, harassed,
and sometimes physically attacked. (Alterman, 2000, p.110)
The fact that all three of Egypt’s post-revolution leaders have been
authoritarian in nature dilutes the applicability of the repression perspective.
The indicator in question is not so much the amount force, but the perception
of such force by the general pubic. This understanding is related to the overall
concept of relative deprivation. Gurr explains the state’s coercive force can be
both a deterrent as well as accelerant to fomenting rebellion. The use of state
violence as a threat coupled with the use of imprisonment can anger people.
Gurr explains, “imposed sanctions are deprivations, the threat of sanctions is
equivalent to the concept of anticipated deprivation, the innate emotional
response to both is anger. But sanctions also inhibit violent responses to
anger” (1970, p.238). According to Gurr a violent response depends on how
legitimate the sanctions and actions of the state are perceived. He states, “the
inference is that the more severe and certain are unjustified sanctions, the
greater the extent of ultimate political violence” (Gurr, 1970, p.238). The
reverse correlation works the same: the more justified sanctions are
perceived the less likely there is to be violent opposition. This relationship fits
the overall relative deprivation model.
Though a regime may be harsh against its opponents, if such actions
are considered justified by the populace then the less likely it is that these
actions will fuel their own dissent. If the public perceives repression as being
in their interests, i.e. exiling and imprisoning bourgeois reactionaries to
39
Nasser’s land reforms and education measures, then repression is less likely
to aid in fomenting dissent, rather it will deter broad based, popular dissent.
Members of the public simultaneously conclude dissent would bring about
unwanted repression and may also thwart their current gains.
Dekmejian describes both of these constraints in one example:  “The
authoritarian nature of the system, coupled with the dependence of most
intellectuals on government jobs, made the voicing of dissent a rare practice”
(1971, p.63). One can easily see how this would apply to the lower and
middle classes who were benefiting from Nasser’s reign. Nasser and the
majority of the public, excluding the groups mentioned previously had a tacit
social contract. As long as the regime continued to endorse economic
equality while raising both expectations and the capabilities to obtain those
expectations political repression was tolerated.
Both the continued and present strength of the Islamist movement and
the continued strength of Egypt’s authoritarian leaders illustrates that another
indicator, one other than repression is responsible for Islamist activism. As
explained by Gurr repression alone is not enough to incite strong political
opposition. The degree to which repression triggers civil unrest, uprising, or
activism is contingent on the general perception of that repression. This
understanding is fitting of the relative deprivation model as it underscores the
fact that state repression is not an absolute evil, it can be popularly tolerated
or popularly opposed depending on the populace’s perception and legitimacy
of the state’s power.
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Chapter 5:
The Infitah: The False Promise of Prosperity
By the 1970s Nasser’s Revolution was unraveling. The reforms were
proving to be unstable and unsustainable. The rapid restructuring of Egyptian
society combined with an increasingly expanding state sector increased
pressure on the Egyptian state and economy. Under the measures of Arab
Socialism the Egyptian state had been induced into an artificial expansion
that was ultimately unsustainable. The state expansion spilled over into other
societal zones, such as education and migration, and no doubt raised the
value expectations of the Egyptian public, especially the lower and middle
classes who benefited the most from Nasser’s land, education, and economic
reforms. The increase in education, the state guarantee of employment, and
the mobilization of the populace exacerbated the strength of the state and at
the same time threatened its stability. It appears that the planners of Arab
Socialism based their policies less on reality and more on political benefits to
the regime and an optimistic forecast. For example,
The Five Year Plan (1960-1965) projected that by the end of the period
development would be completely financed from within the economy:
but in reality outside aid multiplied from about 10 million annually in the
fifties to 100 million pounds in 1964. The 7% annual growth forecast
was around 4%. Public expenses…rose from500 million pounds in
1960 to 1.2 billion in 1966. The number of state employees more than
doubled and the public debt went from 70 million pounds to 350 million
pounds. (Johnson, 1972, p.8)
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In addition to these stresses on the state and economy another dilemma
brought about by both the expansion of education and state services was the
rapid flow of migrants from the rural areas of Egypt to its urban centers of
Cairo and Alexandria, where services were more readily available. The
problem with this migration was the rate of employment did not correspond
with the rate of migration and population growth. The new residents of the city
taxed the state economic system more than they contributed to it. To further
aggravate matters, the cities were not prepared to sufficiently absorb these
bucolic migrants and the migrants themselves were not apt to assimilate into
urban culture and lifestyles. Saad Ibrahim describes this population as urban
villagers who “live in, but are not of the city” (1975, p.39). A large segment of
these urban villagers are “floating internal refugees with no homes but city
streets. They attend no school, do no work, have no cash, buy no goods”
(Ibrahim, 1975, p.39). Ibrahim also notes that these urban villagers account
for half of Cairo’s population (1975).
Where most models, either capitalist or socialist, regard urbanization
as a phenomenon that corresponds with modernization and growth, growing
urban populations can be disproportionate to development. In the case of
Cairo and Alexandria these cities had an influx of peasant populations leaving
their life of rural labor and entering an environment that was not developed
enough to turn them into proletarians. Thus they remained peasants in an
environment not designed for a peasant population. In the case of Egypt,
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urban growth “instead of stimulating modernization, [functioned] as a
pathologic acceleration of urban cancer” (Ibrahim, 1975, p.41).
  A comparison of the rate of public employment to that of private
employment illustrates another example of disproportionate growth.
According to Wickham, “Public employment grew by about 70 percent from
1962 to 1970, at a time when growth in national employment as a whole did
not exceed 20 percent” (2002, p.27). The huge rate of state employment
shows the direct dependence of many Egyptians on state jobs, and even
more so the public’s overall reliance on the state sector.
By the 1970s, Egypt was faced with two major problems, both
consequences of Arab Socialism. The first dealt with how the state could
continue to function at such an asymmetrical rate of growth, subsequently the
second concerned how the public could deal with either a collapsing state or
the restructuring of the state. The Egyptian government was left with no easy
choice. It could continue down the path of Arab Socialism, to what end no one
knew. Or it could attempt to restructure Nasser’s reform and reduce the
public’s reliance on the state.
The death of Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1970 was just
the first major change in what would become a decade of more reforms,
upheaval, and ultimately a rise in Islamist activism. Nasser’s successor,
Anwar Sadat, took the helm of a nation-state that was under an immense
amount of internal and external pressures. As mentioned above Arab
Socialism was under an immense amount of stress, Nasser’s pan Arabism
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had been challenged by Israel’s victory in 1967, and the forces outside of the
Middle East, the US and the USSR, continued to pressure Egypt to play its
role as one of their Cold War pawns. Both these external and internal
pressures threatened to add to the instability and insecurity of Egyptian
society.
 Beginning in the 1970s and coinciding with Sadat’s rise to power
Egypt took steps to alleviate these problems. The first of which was the
expulsion of Soviet advisors in 1972, followed by the launching of the 1973
Yom Kippur War. Both these measure were designed to aid Egypt’s
relationship with the West. The implementation of the Open Door Economic
Policy (ODEP), the infitah, was the final measure in what was envisioned as
Egypt’s integration into the global capitalist system and a new westward
alignment, particularly towards the United States. The infitah liquidated
Egypt’s Soviet leaning Cold War alignment and wholly relinquished the
nation’s claim of positive-neutrality.
Though all three of these seminal events were interdependent, the
infitah was perhaps the most important. Though there are numerous
consequences of the infitah the most important one concerning this project is
the consequences the infitah had on Islamist activism in Egypt. There was a
major problem with this plan. While the infitah sought to reduce the socialist
role of the state by allowing free markets and an inflow of foreign capital,
Egypt’s leaders coached the new measure in an optimistic language,
promising the public more prosperity. The results of the infitah were opposite
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of its promise. Essentially the problem is in the fact that Nasser modernized
Egypt through Arab Socialism while Sadat attempted to turn Egypt away from
socialism and to capitalism. This turn to capitalism could not meet the needs
promised to the public by Arab Socialism nor did the results of the infitah
correspond to its optimistic forecast.    
The infitah or “open door” policy was first outlined in the October Paper
in 1974. As one author explains, the formula in the October Paper was that
“Arab (as well as Western) capital would be wed to western technology and
lured to an emerging market economy in Egypt” (Baker, 1978, p.136). The
promise of this formula lay in the assumption that an open door would create
an “in flow of foreign capital, improved access to advanced technology, a role
for indigenous capital in an expanding private sector, and vast new
employment opportunities for Egyptian labor” (Baker, 1978, p.136). All of
these factors would presumably lead to the growth and development of Egypt
and its reintegration into the global free market.
Rather than being a full reversal from Arab Socialism, the Open Door
Economic Policy seems to have been intended to continue in the spirit of
Nasser’s vision, yet deal with the problems created by the socialist structure.
The October Paper “formally claimed loyalty to the principles of the Nasserite
Revolution, including socialism and Arab nationalism, but argued that their
mode of application must adapt to changing times” (Goldschmidt, 2004,
p.169). The Egyptian Finance Minister Abdel Azziz Hegazy explained “we
needed nationalization to build up our infrastructures and give work to people.
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Now we have moved into a new stage. Those state companies have to start
being profitable. And now there is a place for foreign investment” (A Look
Inside, 1974, p.72). Whether or not Sadat and his advisors truly believed the
Policy was in step with Nasserists concepts, or if this was just the rhetoric
used to placate the populace and left wing, is hard to tell. However, it is
unlikely that Sadat would engineer a policy to purposely weaken the stability
and autonomy of his state. With this in mind the most appropriate way to
regard the infitah is as a policy and formula crafted by Egyptians, yet one
whose implementation came under the heavy influence of international
finance organizations and foreign advisors.
The fact is, the infitah failed to attract the large sums of Western
investment. Arab investment came in greater amounts and the Egyptian
bourgeoisie “celebrated their return from the Nasserite wilderness”
(Goldschmidt, 2004, p.170), but rather than attract investment what the open
door policy attracted more than anything was international debt. As one critic
cites “the country’s total foreign debt, under 3 billion in 1973, had grown to 16
billion by 1979” (Weinbaum, 1986, p.119). Another adds external debt
“increased on an average of 28 percent per year under Sadat, compared to
13 percent over the previous ten years” (Stork, 1982, p.12). The following
chart illustrates this annual increase in Egypt’s debt in the years after the
infitah’s implementation.
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Medium and long term loan and grant commitments ($ million)
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
US      _  60.8   458.4   731.3   818.5  839.6
W. Germany   59.1   83.1    99.8   91.4   107.8  158.1
France      _   40.0    81.4   113.0      _  107.0
Japan   11.3   22.7   178.6   39.2    85.9    16.3
Arab States   905.0  1,603.0  2,774.0  1,072.0   1,751.0   885.0
World Bank/
IDA
  74.9   140.0    132.0    197.0    370.0   164.0
(Fig 3)2
One of the main points of the ODEP was to confirm to the West and
other investors that their investments would be safe from the state seizures
that occurred as a result of the July Laws. By providing protections against
nationalization and inviting the input of foreign consultants, Egypt was able to
illustrate its sincerity in protecting private property. This security along with
the over all opening of the market allowed Egypt to obtain loans larger than it
ever had under Nasser. In the immediate post-infitah period Egypt received a
loan from the World Bank for US $227 million dollars. Prior to this “the largest
loan Egypt had ever received from the World Bank was for US $60 million”
(Goldschmidt, 2004, p.169). Thus the policy allowed Egypt to receive loans
                                                 
2 Source: Ikram, (Stork, 1982 p.12).
47
that were presumably based on projected returns of capital gained through
the Open Door Economic Policy.
Of course the Policy never lived up to these projections. As a whole
“the expectations raised of Sadat’s economic solution [were] not fulfilled.
Heightened class conflict [were] the result. Hardships for Egypt’s people
implicit in the limited results of the program [were] not borne equally. Social
cleavages [were] widened as a result of the differential impact, and social
violence reminiscent of the 1940s [had] surfaced” (Baker, 1978, p.149).
 The role of foreign interests in the Policy and its failure should not be
underestimated. After all the fundamentals of the infitah’s formula revolved
around foreign investment, which easily became foreign involvement “in
encouraging, coaching, and pressuring Egypt to further liberalize its
economy” (Dessouki, 1981, p.411). This should not come as a surprise as
“developing countries are highly susceptible to external influences—given
such countries low degree of political institutionalization, political and social
instability, the general structure of international economic relations, and most
importantly their dependence upon the outside world in almost every
respect—from food to armaments” (Dessouki, 1981, p.412).
Economic liberalization did little to aid the Egyptian public. At the
mercy of foreign nations and institutions like the IMF and World Bank, Egypt
enacted policies that were disastrous in promoting stability and strong
development. These policies only seemed to promote a reduction in
sovereignty and aid the profitability of foreign investment.
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Examples of these policies included: cuts in food subsidies, the
establishment of free trade zones, which included investment incentives such
as “tax exemption for the company and no income tax for foreign employees”
(Baker, 1978, p.145). To further illustrate how the Policy favored foreigners
over Egyptians it is worth noting that: “Egyptian labor requirements were
eased for companies outside the free zone and removed for companies in the
free zone” (Baker, 1978, p.145). World Bank members advised: “it would
further appear desirable to reconsider the role of worker’s economic rights”
(Abdel-Khalek, 1981, p.402). And the entire “dismantling of public sector
institutions” was recommended (Dessouki, 1981, p.414). In short the infitah
became a policy more about privatization and profit than it was about
progress, development and the public.
The reality of the infitah, despite what its stated intent was, was not lost
on the Egyptian people. In the years that followed the infitah implementation
unrest simmered among the populace. Moves to privatize the inflated public
sectors that had grown at a rate disproportionately larger than the economy,
antagonized the employees of these sectors.  In 1976 Cairo witnessed
“perhaps the largest strike in 20 years” (“Popular Opposition,” 1976, p.23)
when the bus drivers and other public employees went on strike. The fact that
the strike was broken up by the police and the army no doubt led helped
further the feeling of frustration among Egyptians.
Another example of civil unrest in Egypt is the 1977 food riots. The
New York Times reported “thousands of Egyptian students and workers
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stormed through central Cairo and other cities in an outburst of anger over
price increases ordered by the Government…” (“Thousands in Egypt,” 1977,
p.7). The Times also reported the reduction in subsidies came at the urging of
the IMF (Tanner, 1977). The riots left 100 people dead and 800 injured
(“Egypt Raises Some Prices,” 1978). Resistance to the reforms initiated by
ODEP and recommended by foreign advisors came from both the public
sector as well as the populace.
Based on the examples given above and over all assessments by
other sources (Baker, 1978; Dessouki, 1981; Abdel-Khalek, 1981;
Goldschmidt, 2004; Wickham, 2002) the infitah failed to promote stability and
prosperity in Egypt. Instead it wrought instability, exasperated social
cleavages, and revealed the harsher aspects of the authoritarian state, all the
while binding Egypt into a cycle of debt and dependency. Overall the
widespread skepticism of the infitah existed to such an extent that Baker
observed at the time that, “the mass of the Egyptian people do not require
arcane analyses of the shortcomings of the open door policy nor statistical
confirmation of income distribution studies to know that their standard of living
is eroding sharply” (1981, p.379). Thus the failure of the infitah crafted the
sharp reversal of fortune, or at the least the popular perception of a sharp
reversal necessary to foment an environment ripe for civil unrest.
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Chapter 6:
The Response of the Islamic Sector
The Muslim Brotherhood is credited as being the first major Islamist
organization in Egypt. Since it was founded in 1928 the Brotherhood has
been a centralizing figure of Islamist activism both in Egypt and in other parts
of the Middle East. This organization’s level of involvement in society and
politics has fluctuated over the years. At the outset of its founding it was
mostly a charitable, social organization set on “reconciling modern life with
Islamic values” (Aslan, 2005, p.236) through the “Islamization of society”
(Aslan, 2005, p.236) by gaining followers due to good works. At the same
time however, the Brotherhood hovered on the periphery of politics in the
making of the modern Middle East. Though the nation-states and their
leaders were the major players in inter-war and post-war periods, the role of
the Muslim Brotherhood is something despots, dictators and scholars have
had to contend with in order to obtain any meaningful analysis of the present
day Middle East.
Though the popularity of the Islamist movement has fluctuated in
Egypt, it should be understood that among Islamists the Muslim Brotherhood
has continuously been the most prominent organization. Thus during the
decline of the Islamist movement under Nasser the Muslim Brotherhood was
still the strongest Islamist entity and their strength needed to be monitored
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and repressed as much as possible. Yet as mentioned previously, Nasser’s
repression is not enough to explain the absence of Islamist activism.
Saad Ibrahim explains that, ‘the MB has been a grassroots movement
with an appeal mainly to lower-middle classes” (2002, p.36). Noting this
Ibrahim concludes that “the Nasser led July Revolution appealed to the same
constituency” (2002, p.36).  Ibrahim’s observation reinforces the already
mentioned understanding that under Nasser there was little incentive to rebel.
Since Nasser and the MB apparently shared and appealed to the same
constituency, the lower and middle classes under Nasser would have been
less attracted to a rival movement or rival ideology. If the regime failed to
appeal to the lower middle classes’ interests this same constituency would
lessen both its loyalty and complacency under the ruling regime, which is
precisely what happened under Sadat.
The reversal of Arab Socialism and the reintegration into the world
capitalist system under the infitah angered many Egyptians, as the open door
policy failed to live up to its expectations and weakened the socialist state
sector. Subsequently the Islamist movement reemerged as a politically potent
force. The Muslim Brotherhood in particular was able to reemerge from its
Nasser-era isolation and seeming irrelevance into a strong reckoning force.
 Even though this paper focuses on structural factors contributing to
the rise in Islamist activism it is not possible to ignore specific decisions of the
Egyptian leadership that helped lead to the Islamist resurgence. Most notably
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is the laxity of certain laws concerning Islamists at the beginning of Sadat’s
rule.
From his beginning days in power Sadat was already perceivably
different from Nasser. Sadat’s reign can be best characterized as a move
away from the ideologies of the left and towards a more right leaning
worldview. This is seen both in Sadat’s international behavior as well as in his
domestic policies.
 As early as 1972 Sadat began liquidating Egypt’s relationship with the
Soviets. He expelled the USSR military advisors from the country, frustrated
by Russia’s reluctance to give Egypt the weapons it desired. At this time the
US and Russia were promoting a Middle East policy of no war, no peace
hoping to maintain the post-1967 status quo. With the Egyptian defeat in 1967
Sadat was under political pressure to regain Egypt’s fallen honor, as well as
the Sinai Peninsula. On October 6, 1973 Sadat launched the Yom Kippur War
and crossed the Suez into the Israeli occupied Sinai. Henry Kissinger
explains Sadat’s strategy:
Every American and Israeli assessment before October 1973 had
agreed that Egypt and Syria lacked the military capabilities to regain
territory by force of arms. What no one understood at first was that
Sadat was aiming not for conquest but to change the equilibrium in
negotiations he intended to start. The shock of war; he reasoned would
enable both sides, Israeli as well as Egypt, to show flexibility that was
impossible while Israel considered itself militarily supreme….
(Kissinger, 2003, p.12)
The flexing of Egyptian muscle told the Israelis, but particularly the US that
Egypt could not be ignored. The expulsion of the Soviets illustrated Egypt’s
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cessation as a communist client state and invited US alignment in a region
that was mostly hostile to US interests.
By distancing his nation from the USSR and maneuvering towards the
US, Sadat created more political turmoil. A nation raised on the concepts of
Arab Socialism, even it if it was internationally unaligned would not quietly
swallow the idea of integration within a US dominated capitalist-imperialist
system. At the same time the sentences of members of the Muslim
Brotherhood, jailed under Nasser, were set to expire and large numbers were
released from prison. Sadat saw the opportunity to take care of two problems
at the same time.
In order to counter the complaints and power of the socialists and
communists Sadat used the Islamists as a means to siphon off the strength of
leftist opposition. Sadat allowed and encouraged the formation of Islamic
student associations in the hopes “of developing an effective counterweight to
the leftist groups that dominated student politics at the time” (Wickham, 2002,
p.96). Sadat also began referring to himself as “the believer president” in
order to foster an Islamic aura absent in Nasser, and of course to help co-opt
the new Islamist groups.
 Sadat believed that by weakening the political vitality of the left with
the Islamist right he would create less opposition to his liberal economic
policies. This allowed the Islamist organizations to create and foster a political
movement and infrastructure that did indeed rival the left, yet this plan
backfired. The analysis, and critiques of the Open Door Economic Policy from
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the Islamists was “nearly identical with that of the secular left” (Ibrahim, 2002,
p40). In fact instead of dividing the opposition Sadat created two wings from
which dissent and criticism could take center stage, the broad “opposition to
the West and the westernization of the open door [provided] an important
bridge between the left and the religious right” (Baker, 1981, p.382). The fact
that both the left and the right were united in their criticism of the infitah helps
illustrate the significance of the socioeconomic factors in fueling activism.
  The Islamists’ critique of the infitah reads as if it could have been
written by the social democrats, or other left leaning movements. For example
one MB publication discussed the causes of the 1977 riots and popular
discontent, explaining that, “The ruling party and its deputies are isolated from
the people who reject the latest economic measures…those who burned and
looted public and private property would not have done so had they felt any
sense of belonging to this country or sharing in its wealth…they are poor,
humiliated, and bitter” (Ibrahim, 2002, p.40).
 Another article entitled “Don’t Hide Your Heads in the Sand” traces the
origins of resentment and disdain towards the regime by listing three
contributors to the public’s unrest. The first criticism cited is rampant social
injustice, followed by excessive dream selling, and thirdly a neglect of
religious education and piety among the nation’s leadership. According to the
author of the article:
the ruling class in Egypt has appropriated for itself unprecedented
privileges. The average citizen perceives glaring inequality… The gap
between expectations and achievement sharpened the contradictions
created by injustice. The suffering of the average citizen has intensified
55
due to the multiplicity of problems in his daily life—transportation, food,
clothing, and housing. Prices have skyrocketed with every sunrise,
while incomes of the majority have remained the same or
declined…Meanwhile the state and the class which controls authority
are building luxury housing and living conspicuously. (Ibrahim, 2002,
pp.40-41)
Meanwhile the left voiced similar concerns as Baker observes:
The disquiet of the poor and their intellectual sympathizers is
heightened by the sense that the benefits of Nassersit socialism are
being taken from them…Despite repeated official disclaimers, the
emphasis on the role of the private sector built into the open door has
stimulated widespread fears that a weakening and then dismantling of
the public sector is in the offing. Such apprehensions are concentrated
on the left of the political spectrum…(1981, p.380)
The criticism of economic policy from both the Muslim Brotherhood and the
Egyptian left shows that the infitah’s policies and consequences were the
primary sources of frustration among Egyptians. The similarity in the
opposition from communists, Nasserites and the dissenting voice from the
Muslim Brotherhood illustrate a general complaint about the socio-economic
programs of the 1970s. Thus everyone’s unhappiness, frustration, and
grievances were in response, not to Israel or Western Civilization rather they
were the consequence of reversing the public’s wellbeing, or a perceived
reversal of their wellbeing. The anti-western complaints rose from structural
effects of capitalism and the consequential decrease in Egyptian material
wellbeing, not out of cultural hatreds.
Thus as already explained, but reiterated here: the socialist reforms
under Nasser created a rise in the Egyptian standard of living through
modernization, this further fueled an increase in not only value expectations
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but also value capabilities among the Egyptian middle and lower classes. The
increased development consequential to these reforms however, was
unsustainable. The burdens of socialism on the state and economy were
troublesome alone. The rapid rates of growth in the Egypt’s urban centers
only put greater stress on the system. As a result state sector growth and
urban expansion along with popular expectations continued at a rate
disproportionate to the growth of sustainable development, employment and
capabilities. The problems became paramount at the beginning of the 1970s.
To stave off a social and economic collapse Sadat drafted the ODEP. In order
to stymie left-wing opposition to economic liberalization Sadat encouraged the
growth of Islamic groups. The infitah’ s failure to attract foreign investment
and uncanny ability to attract foreign debt complicated the problems of
Egypt’s development, further antagonizing the nation’s instability and social
unrest. As the reliance on the state diminished and the state’s public sector
weakened the newly resurrected, well-financed Islamic sector increased in its
importance of providing services for the well being of Egyptians.
In addition to encouraging the development of Islamic groups Sadat
also aided in the development of an Islamic sector of society. For example
Sadat passed legislation making any building containing a Mosque tax
exempt. Outside influences, mainly patrons in the Gulf-states contributed to
the proliferation of private mosques. As Wickham explains, estimates of
private mosque expansion in Egypt showed an increase “from 20,000 in 1970
to more than 46,000 in 1981” (2002, p.96).
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These private mosques worked as their own network creating a
structure of community services that ran parallel to those of the state. Ibrahim
describes some of the services noting that, “among the widespread facilities
are the medical services to be found in more than twenty thousand non-
governmental mosques…Similar educational and other social services are
rendered by nonviolent Islamic activists. Often these are located on the
premises of non-governmental mosques” (Ibrahim, 2002, p.60). Wickham
reinforces Ibrahim’s observations of the mosques’ social and economic
significance stating that: “in addition to hosting daily and Friday noon prayers,
private mosques often provided a wide variety of religious and community
services…[these] might include a health clinic, kindergarten, charity
distribution” (2002, p.98).
The private mosque played an important role, “particularly in low
income neighborhoods on the periphery of Cairo, where government services
were scarce and networks of communal self-help were underdeveloped, the
local mosque and its satellite institutions often became focal points of
community social life” (Wickham, 2002, p.98). As Ibrahim observes the
Islamists set about “establishing concrete Islamic alternatives to the
socioeconomic institutions of the state” (Ibrahim, 2002, p.61).
The difference between the Islamist response and the left’s response
is in the importance of the mosque as a remedy to collapsing socialism.
Where the left was only able to demand political and economic reform, the
Islamists demanded these changes while offering aid and relief from the
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shocks of Sadat’s reforms.  The class cleavages, rising prices, and perceived
inequalities in the dissemination of privileges between the ruling class and
other classes created an environment salient to rebellion, civil unrest, but
most importantly activism.  Several groups opposed the infitah and had the
same sentiments towards Sadat’s regime; however, the rise of Islamist
activism, and its sustain comes not from complaints against the regime by
organization’s like the Muslim Brotherhood, but rather both are a result of the
popular plight of the people and the Islamists’ direct response to this plight by
lessening social and economic hardships. The importance of these Islamic
institutions allowed the popular unrest wrought by the infitah to be siphoned
into, and sculpted by the Islamist ideology.
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Conclusion
Anwar Sadat was assassinated on October 6, 1981. As tempting as it
is to use Sadat’s assassination as a conclusive example of his unpopularity in
comparison with Nasser one should refrain from such a comparison, as there
were several attempts on Nasser’s life. A more significant comparison can be
made not in how they died, but rather in how they were missed. Said K.
Aburish (2004) estimates the number of mourners who took to the streets
after Nasser’s death to be between four and five million. The New York Times
explained that “Gamal Abdel Nasser was buried after a tumultuous, frenzied,
funeral procession through streets packed with millions…” (Anderson, 1970,
p.1).  The article goes on to articulate the scale and intensity of grief among
the Egyptians:
People broke through the ranks of troops, defying flailing batons, to
touch and kiss the coffin. The soldiers, who had been marching
solemnly in step were swept aside, infiltrated and surrounded. ‘Lets us
carry him!’ men cried as they grabbed at the coffin. ‘He is ours….’
Thousands shouted and waved handkerchiefs in farewell to their
leader…the people raised banners and black-framed portraits of
Nasser and shouted his name.  (Anderson, 1970, p.1)
In contrast to the intense public mourning for Nasser is the absence of grief
and abundance of confusion on behalf of many Egyptian’s sentiments
towards Sadat.  Marie-Christine Aulas describes the atmosphere surrounding
Sadat’s funeral, noting first that the most striking aspect of the service was,
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the silence of the population, unusual among a people not
accustomed to hiding their feelings…Equally unusual was the decision
of the authorities to hold the funeral far from any urban center…People
did not express their sorrow in the usual fashion—by composing dirges
or by taking up the traditional and moving refrain of national unity…on
the contrary: as soon as the funeral was over, jokes sprang up on
every side…vied in irony, sarcasm and scorn toward the deceased.
Thus did Egypt break with its traditions, graphically displaying the
changes that had taken place during the course of Sadat’s presidency.
(1982, p.6)
Yet, which changes are Aulas referring to? The conventional and
confrontationists scholars largely perceive public disaffection for Sadat as a
consequence of his peace deal with Israel. There is a certain amount of
relevance to this argument; however, to view the attitudinal changes in
Egypt’s population only through the spectrum of the Israeli/Arab conflict is far
too narrow.  The Egyptian defeat of 1967 certainly had an impact on public
perceptions and legitimacy of the state, yet when Nasser tried to step down
there were large public protests against the move. Thus its seems the defeat
of 1967 was not enough alone to create public discontent and activism. Even
though Nasser was not forced out of office the legacy of 1967 certainly had
an impact on Egyptian attitudes towards Arab Socialism and Pan Arabism
throughout the 1970s, yet its significance is over emphasized.
Some will still argue that the significance of the Camp David Accord
was the event that spurred the Islamist resurgence. Camp David no doubt
played a significant role in further alienating Sadat from the Egyptian public.
This alienation came from the fact that Camp David contradicted Sadat’s
statements made in Jerusalem in 1977, where he claimed, “I did not come to
61
you with a view to concluding a separate peace agreement between Egypt
and Israel…no separate peace between Egypt and Israel—or between any
confrontation state and Israel—could secure a lasting and just peace in the
region as a whole” (Smith, 2001, p.396). Despite this statement Camp David
resulted in a “separate peace” and left out any solution to the Palestinian
problem. The perceived failure of Camp David certainly added to the
frustration of the Egyptians with Sadat; however, it did not cause them.
Rather it was only another failed promise after a decade of failing promises.
The riots of 1977 and the protests of 1976 all happened prior to Camp David.
The criticism of Camp David, much like the criticism of the infitah came from
all sectors and ideologies within Egypt, not only the Islamists.
The perception that there exists a near causal relationship between
1967, Camp David and the resurgence of the Islamist movement ignores the
impact of the seismic changes that Egypt underwent in the post-revolutionary
period, and the emergence of the modern Egyptian state. Instead of focusing
only on Egypt’s foreign policy and regional role, any attempt to explain the
Islamist movement should look at the tumultuous changes in Egyptian
society. First there were the reforms under Nasser, and then the near reversal
of these reforms under Sadat. The environment of civil unrest, wrought by
relative deprivation in 1970s Egypt created a crisis in which the Islamic sector
could adequately respond. The results of the 1967 war and Camp David are
events that took place within the foreground of Egyptian political and social
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life. These two events must be viewed within the context of a background that
was comprised of three decades worth of modernization and social change.
When seeking an explanation of the pattern of Islamist activism less
emphasis should be put on Israel and notions of Arab and Muslim
vehemence. The most significant changes are those that have more to do
with the impact modernization had on the populaces’ own social, political and
economic orientations. As this paper has argued the restructuring of Egyptian
society from one largely based on a feudal system to a socialist system, and
later to a free market capitalist system most certainly plays a significant role in
the rise of Islamist activism. These changes and their consequences on the
perceptions of Egyptians, as well as the consequences in their physical and
material life, has led to discontent and mobilization. Thus it appears that this
activism is correlated to relative deprivation as opposed to being a broad
cultural reaction to Western Civilization.
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